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Abstract
There have been heated debates on whether private health insurance creates moral hazard
eﬀects. Despite its importance, however, the moral hazard problem of private health insurance
is still controversial and understudied. To empirically examine whether or not moral hazard
exists in the Korean private health insurance market, we employed two-stage regression for
endogeneity control and the Heckman two-step procedure for sample selection bias control,
which are expected to produce consistent estimates. All estimation results do not allow us to
detect the presence of the moral hazard eﬀects and imply that people hold private health
insurance simply as “safety net”.
Keywords: private health insurance; moral hazard; endogeneity; sample selection bias
JEL Classiﬁcation: I10, I11
I. Introduction
The problem of moral hazard in health care and health insurance has long been discussed
in economic literature. There are two ways in deﬁning moral hazard in insurance markets: 1) ex
ante and 2) ex post moral hazard. The ﬁrst type indicates the risky behavior itself. For example,
those who have automobile insurance may tend to be less careful of driving, thereby increasing
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＊ Corresponding Authorthe risk of an accident. In the same manner, after purchasing ﬁre insurance, people may tend to
less care about preventing ﬁres. On the other hand, moral hazard falling into the second
category does not result in more risky behaviors, but rather in more costly consequences. For
instance, after purchasing medical insurance, health care services available become cheaper for
individuals, and therefore people may consume more services than they would otherwise, all
else being equal (Pauly, 1968; Zweifel and Manning, 2000; Anne, 2009). This paper adopts the
second deﬁnition of moral hazard to see whether people face incentives to consume more
medical services than the optimal level since they do not have to pay the full marginal costs by
purchasing health insurance.
Does this ex post moral hazard problem exist in Korean insurance market? To answer this
question, one may have to understand the unique health care system of Korea. Korea introduced
mandatory social health insurance for industrial workers in large corporations in 1977, and
extended it incrementally to the self-employed until it covered the entire population in 1989. In
addition to the universal health care system, private health insurance in Korea plays a role as
supplemental insurance; people voluntarily purchase private health insurance if they feel that
public-mandated insurance is not suﬃcient or if they want to reduce potential burdens further
which can be caused by unexpected diseases or accidents in the future.
This paper speciﬁcally aims to detect the problem of moral hazard in Korean private
health insurance market. We focus on this issue since there have been few studies dealing with
the supplemental insurance, and thus it can allow us to re-evaluate the role of private health
insurance and to design policies that can take advantage of it in accordance with public
insurance. In SectionⅡ,w eﬁrst discuss previous studies conducted with the same issues and
ﬁnd our own strategies for the following analysis. We then perform empirical analysis with
several econometric tools in order to investigate the eﬀects of having private health insurance
on medical care use by eﬀectively controlling other confounding factors in Section III, and the
empirical results are introduced in Section IV. Section V concludes.
II. Literature Review
The presence of health insurance and the demand for health care are intimately related,
and it has been widely recognized and examined since Arrow (1963) pointed out the moral
hazard problem. According to his claim, health insurance may allow the insured to over-utilize
health care services since it distorts the eﬀective price of services in the market. McCall et al.
(1991), Christenson et al. (1987), Lillard and Logowski (1995), Khandker and McCormick
(1999), and Atherly (2001) attempted to empirically estimate the impact of supplemental health
insurance on medical service consumption and all claimed that the insured demands more
services. There is no agreement, however, on how much of this demand gap between the
insured and the uninsured can be explained by the moral hazard problem (Wolfe and
Goddeeris, 1991; Ettner, 1997; Hurd and McGarry, 1997; Chiappori et al., 1998; Buchmueller
et al., 2004; Sapelli and Vial, 2003). Moreover, estimating the moral hazard eﬀects entails
signiﬁcant problems in that not only is the demand for health care determined by the insurance
status but also the insurance decision itself depends on expected future consumption of health
care services; there may be mutual interdependence between health insurance and health care,
leading to the simple regression estimator biased (Cameron et al. 1988; Edward et al. 1995).
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In Korean context, Yu (1983) conducted a pioneering study when the universal health care
system was not yet established in Korea but only about thirty percent of the total population
was covered by various health insurance plans. He chose four categories of treatments
(appendectomy cholecystectomy, tonsillectomy, cesarean section and respiratory tract infection),
and investigated whether there were diﬀerences in quantities, length, charges, and qualities of
medical care services between the insured and the non-insured. The major ﬁndings conﬁrmed
the moral hazard hypothesis; the volume of services was greater and the length of stay was
longer among the insured whereas quality of care did not show statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences. On the other hand, Seo (1981) suggested a confounding result in his study during
the similar period. The author classiﬁed hospitals in three categories - university hospital,
general hospital, hospital ̶ and selected two diseases ̶ acute appendicitis and normal
delivery ̶ to compare the patterns of medical consumption before and after introduction of
public health insurance in Korea. The results show that there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
the average length of stay and the average total hospital costs of both diseases in all types of
hospitals. These two studies might have yielded inconsistent results due to the diﬀerent methods
adopted in selecting and categorizing the samples, and more importantly, the institutional
instability during that time.
Since the National Health Insurance (NHI) began to play a role as primary insurance while
private health insurance as supplemental in 1989, there have been a heated debate on whether
private health insurance creates social inequality and worsens the ﬁnancial status of the NHI;
however, most of them are lack of speciﬁc ground and empirical evidence. Thus, Yun and
Kwon (2008) recently attempted empirical analysis based on the survey conducted from 2004 to
2006. The total sample used in this research was 406,751, acquired by a random sampling
method, and was divided into two groups, private insurance holders and the other group, to see
whether they are diﬀerent in medical care utilization level. The results imply that the private
insurance holders do not consume more medical services than the others, which can alleviate
concerns over the moral hazard problem in Korean private insurance market. The analysis,
however, is solely based on mean and percentage calculation; by this method, the eﬀects of
other factors that can inﬂuence dependent variables and individualsʼ own characteristics are not
controlled.
As one can notice, the moral hazard problem of private health insurance in Korea is still
controversial and understudied. Its importance as supplemental insurance to the NHI, on the
other hand, continues to increase as the NHI coverage rate remains only about 65% out of total
medical expenditure, much lower than 80% of the average rate for OECD member countries,
and as the proportion having private health insurance is as high as 64% of the total population.
1
Furthermore, because the privatization policy is one of the key elements of the current
President Leeʼs economic plan, various ways to promote private insurance are also largely being
discussed. Therefore, it is important to investigate whether the moral hazard problem exists in
private health insurance and whether it places more ﬁnancial burdens to the NHI which has
suﬀered from budget deﬁcit for recent years. It may also be useful to extend the results to other
countries where the universal health care system exists and private insurance supplements it.
Having considered its importance, therefore, this study seeks to ﬁnd answers for the question
DE-MYSTIFYING THE INCONVENIENT TRUTH: 2010] 131




As previously mentioned, this study aims to uncover moral hazard eﬀects in private health
insurance. Yun and Kwonʼs latest study (2008) performed a research to empirically prove such
eﬀects, relying on mean and percentage values. By this method, however, causal relationships
are not revealed; if the group of the insured consists of people who have certain characteristics
in common, high or low mean of medical service demand may not result from insurance status
but from those idiosyncratic characteristics. Thus, to control this eﬀect, we ﬁr s te s t i m a t et h e
probability of purchasing private health insurance. Besides, since Korea has the universal health
care system, it is worth studying who has additional supplemental private insurance and what
determines the decision. The following equation is estimated by using probit model.
Ii=p0+p1Xi+p2Hi+p3Bi+p4PRi+wi (1)
Ii: a dummy variable indicating private insurance status
(1if one is enrolled in private health insurance and 0 otherwise)
Xi: a vector of socio-demographic variables
Hi: a vector of health status variables
Bi: a control variable measuring individualsʼ eﬀorts or preferences to improve health
PRi: National Health Insurance (NHI) premium each individual pays.
wi: an error term assumed to follow a white-noise process
The socio-demographic variables include age, gender, marital status, education level,
occupational status, number of family members, and income level. Other key explanatory
variables are related to individualsʼ health status. This empirical analysis deﬁnes health status in
two diﬀerent ways: one is a subjective ﬁve-point scale answer as for the question “how do you
think of your overall health conditions?”
2; the other is an objective measure of health by
summing up the number of all chronic diseases that the respondent has, if any, such as
diabetes, high blood pressure, anemia, asthma, arthritis and so on. We also tried to measure
each individualʼs “intention” to improve health; if one puts higher eﬀorts to enhance his or her
health, it would mean that they care more about physical well-being and thus their willingness
to consume health care services and willingness to pay for them could be higher than
otherwise. There is no such a straightforward question in the questionnaire. Therefore, we
deﬁned four areas standing for health promotion behaviors as 1) alcohol consumption, 2)
cigarette consumption, 3) regular exercises, and 4) weight management, and indexed them into
three-scale points; if one endeavored much, satisfying certain criteria, he will get 2 points; if
one performed all right, he will get 1point; if one was reckless in caring health, he will get
nothing.
3 These are summed up and reduced to one variable referring to “degrees of caring
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2 The answers can be 1) very bad, 2) bad, 3) normal, 4) good, or 5) very good.
3 1) For drinking, we assigned 2 if one has never taken any alcoholic beverage, 1 if one drinks less than once ahealth”. Lastly, insurance premium is included.
Then we verify whether private health insurance aﬀects individualsʼ decisions to visit
doctors. The equation (2) is established to estimate the eﬀect.
PV1i=a0+a1Xi+a2Ii+a3Hi+a4Bi+ei (2)
PV1i: the annual number of physician visits including in- and out- patients
4
ei: an error term assumed to follow a white-noise process
In estimating the equation (2), Poisson and negative binomial models can be considered
given that both are good models for count data (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). In the Poisson
model, the variance in the number of accidents is equal to the mean whereas in the binomial
model, the variance is larger than the mean; the latter is more appropriate for the data
overdispersed. In order to see which model works better, we performed a goodness-of-ﬁtt e s t
by using the Pearson statistic after estimating the Poisson regression. If the test is signiﬁcant,
the Poisson model can be viewed as inappropriate and the negative binomial model should be
considered. The test result, however, does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the
Poisson distribution ﬁts the data, so it is adopted as a suitable model
5.
However, as many health economists insist (Cameron, et al., 1988), an individualʼs
expected medical care utilization could aﬀect his or her decision on choice of health insurance,
and the existence of health insurance could aﬀect his utilization of medical care services, which
suggests there is mutual interdependency between the decision of medical care use and health
insurance purchase. Hence, a simple Poisson regression model may not produce consistent
estimates of parameters. In other words, if two error terms of equation (1) and (2) are
correlated each other which can be a source of endogeneity bias, it is highly likely that the
unobservable characteristics included in ei of equation (2) are correlated with some of the
observed explanatory variables in that equation. Therefore, to control such endogeneity
problem, we adopted the two-step method by using both equation (1) and (2). That is, the
predicted value of ÎI, which is obtained from estimating equation (1), substitutes the actual
value of Ii, and the same Poisson regression method is used for the second step.
In this process of applying the two-step method, as shown in equation (2), PRi, the NHI
insurance premium variable is utilized as an instrumental variable. According to Wooldridge
(2002), when the estimation model includes one endogenous variable, at least one instrument is
necessary to identify it. Intuitively, using PRi as an instrument can be justiﬁed by the way the
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month, and 0 otherwise; 2) For smoking, we assigned 2 if one has never smoked, 1if one had smoked in the past but
stopped recently, and 0 otherwise; 3) For exercises, we assigned 2 if one has performed mid-level physical activities,
such as tennis, badminton, yoga, or swimming, more than 5 days a week and over 10 minutes per day, 1 if one has
performed those at least one day per week, and 0 if one has performed nothing; 4) For weight management, we
assigned 2 if oneʼs BMI is more than 18.5 and less than 25, 1 if BMI is less than 18.5 or more than 25 but still less
than 30, and 0 if BMI is over 30.
4 Since ex-post moral hazard assumes that patients can choose arbitrary amount of medical services, it seems
important to make the concept of “the number of visits” be clear. Although the total amount of medical care use could
be aﬀected by the supply side due to medical knowledge imbalance between doctors and patients, patients can choose
whether or not to visit doctors when they feel sick. So we deﬁne “the number of visits” to be “the number of episodes”
in this paper. This concept suggests a patientʼs decision on visiting a doctor is mainly determined by the patient
him/herself even if the supply side could aﬀect patientʼs follow-up visit with the same episode. The information on who
initiated the respondentʼs ﬁrst doctor-visit with an episode is clearly shown at the survey questionnaire this study used.
5 Test results are available upon request.Korean government exogenously imposes the contributions of NHI. First, for the employee
insured, the contribution amount is calculated by multiplying monthly salary to the contribution
rate, and is deducted from the monthly salary. Second, for the self-employed insured, the
contribution amount for those who have an income is calculated in the same way above, but for
those who have no income, their contribution amount shall be equal to the average monthly
contribution of the Korean self-employed in the previous year. Hence “NHI premium” might
work as an appropriate instrument variable in that it is unlikely to be related to individual
medical service use because the mechanism of determining it by Korean central government
does not truthfully represent the individual real income level, and because the individual use of
medical care might be mainly aﬀected by peopleʼs health conditions or private health insurance
status as the ex post moral hazard assumption predicts. Thus we can secure the variableʼs
exogeneity and this paper will discuss more about the validity of the instrumental variable later
by conducting a series of tests and by introducing the mechanism of determining the premium
in detail.
Another econometric issue that may bias the estimation result of equation (1) and (2)
above is the existence of sample selection bias. This sample selection problem has long been
discussed in health economics literature; in some data which involve a number of zero
responses, a researcher may face such questions as “how would many zeros aﬀect estimation
results?” and “do those zeros represent actual choices of individuals?” In our data representing
medical service utilization, there are 2,456 non doctor-visits out of total 4,513, thus we have to
verify how results will change after properly excluding them. According to Duan et. al, (1984),
censored data approach requires restrictive distributional assumptions and as the censored data
are unobservable, these assumptions are not testable. Maddala (1985), however, stresses the
need to understand the nature of the underlying decision process in selecting an empirical
model and argues that joint decisions of visiting a doctor and the amount of consumption of
medical care conditional on any visit may be more appropriate. In other words, if there are
some common omitted variables, the two decisions will be correlated which might cause the
estimation results to be biased. Thus, it is worth trying to jointly estimate, and check whether
the sample selection problem which is caused by correlation of two error terms, is critical in
the model.
Heckman (1976, 1979) has suggested a practical model to deal with such situations, which
treats the selection problem as an omitted variable problem. Although this solution known as
the two-step or the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) method has been recently
criticized due to its small-sample properties, according to Puhaniʼs Monte Carlo studies (2000),
it still yields reasonable results except when multicollinearity problems are critical; in this case,
subsample OLS (or the Two-Part Model) is the most robust among the easy-to-implement
estimators (Puhani, 2000). Hence, in this paper, in order to test multicollinearity, the Variation
Inﬂation Factor (VIF) was used, and the result was 1.48, much lower than that of a concern.
6
Heckmanʼs model, however, is a standard approach to account for sample selectivity in the
linear regression model, so it is not appropriate for our model which is based on count data.
Greene (1995) has extended this Heckman model to the Poisson regression model for count
data; the procedure begins by ﬁtting the probit model as earlier, computing the inverse Millʼs
ratio ̶ the ratio of the probability density function over the cumulative distribution function
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s   
̶ for the selected observations, then ﬁtting the Poisson model with this augmented
conditional mean function by maximum likelihood. We adopt this method as another
alternative.








PV2i is a dichotomous variable expressing whether or not one has ever seen a doctor. The
variable TIME represents travel time that one must spend to see a doctor and it is added for the
identiﬁcation issue. Our intuition behind choosing TIME as another exogenous variable is that
while an individualʼs decision on whether to visit doctors could be inﬂuenced by travel time,
once she or he visits a doctor, the total amount of medical care use is largely aﬀected by
suppliers, considering the existence of asymmetric information between patients and doctors. If
it really is so, the role of this variable as an instrument can be justiﬁed. The validity of this
identiﬁcation will be discussed in the next section.
Conditional on positive number of doctor visits, an individual iʼs total medical care use can
be estimated by the next equation.
PV1i(di=1)=a0'+a1'Xi+a2'Î I+a3'H i+a4'B i+rki+ei' (4)
The ki is a new variable standing for the inverse Millʼs ratio. According to the Heckmanʼs
sample selection model, the existence of error-correlation caused by sample selection can be
checked by testing the hypothesis of r=0. If we can reject this hypothesis at the legitimate
signiﬁcance level, it would be desirable to interpret the results by the Heckmanʼs model while
simple estimation without controlling sample selection bias yields better outcomes if we cannot
(Hay and Olsen, 1984). We will use this criterion to assess which model is more reliable later.
The standard errors are adjusted using the robust estimator of variance.
In addition to the number of doctor visits, this study also uses total annual medical
expenditures as another dependent variable conditional on any doctor visit. The reason for using
another dependent variable arises from the concept of ex post moral hazard. As explained, it
indicates a phenomenon that people consume more services than they would otherwise if they
have medical insurance. Thus, the moral hazard of this kind could occur where people expect
private health insurance they hold to reimburse the amount of money they spend for medical
services so that they want to use them more frequently, being less careful of costs, and utilize
more expensive ones. The frequency of physician visits only captures the aspect of patientʼs
being less careful of costs but not the speciﬁc contents of medical care a patient uses, so the
need for including a variable representing how much one spends for medical services comes up.
Even if it is highly plausible to think the speciﬁc contents of medical care a patient uses might
be largely aﬀected by doctors, it is hard for them to know the patientʼs idiosyncratic
characteristics including patientʼs private insurance status unless a patient clearly provides a
doctor with the information in Korea
7. So, a patientʼs willingness to utilize more expensive
medical care services originated from his/her having private health insurance, i.e. ex-post moral
DE-MYSTIFYING THE INCONVENIENT TRUTH: 2010] 135hazard might be analyzed using total annual medical expenditures. Besides, because the
frequencies of health care utilization ̶ i.e. the number of doctor visit - do not contain
information on patientʼs severity of illness, how much one pays per visit can provide more
relevant information. Hence, this part can be viewed as a sensitivity check to see whether there
exists moral hazard even when analyzing the speciﬁc contents of medical services people used
and controlling the severity of diseases people hold.
In doing so, we transformed medical costs into a natural logarithmic form in order to
correct the left-skewed distribution and to scale down the size of coeﬃcients for the sake of
simplicity. The variable, denoted as LMCOST, displaces PV1i in equation (2) and (4), and since
LMCOST is a continuous variable, it is fair to adopt the OLS method instead of the Poisson
regression. So we performed the same procedures by adopting three estimation methods: 1)
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as basic model, 2) Two-Step Least Squares (TSLS) to correct
endogeneity bias which could be caused by individual insurance choice being endogenously
determined, and 3) Heckmanʼs sample selection model to consider potential sample selection
bias; because no visit means no expenditure we may want to censor those who have never seen
a doctor. We will compare the results produced by each model as shown in Table 1.
2. Data
This paper uses the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANS) in Korea
which was conducted in 2005. Although there exist more up-to-date survey results available,
obtained in 2007, it is more legitimate to choose data of 2005 in that they have a larger sample
size and more aﬄuent information on private health insurance such as the number of private
insurances people have, reasons to purchase them, and most importantly how much people pay
for those; on the other hand, data of 2007 do not contain such useful information while only
reporting whether or not the respondent is insured by private companies. Furthermore, the
question itself is diﬀerent: the question in 2005 asks “do you have some private insurance like
cancer insurance sold by private companies?” The same question in 2007, however, asks
somewhat diﬀerently - “do you have some private insurance such as cancer insurance,
cardiovascular disease insurance or auto insurance?” To be more precise, it seems fair to
include only health-related insurance for the following analysis, excluding probabilities of any
bias that can be caused by embracing other insurance types which are seemingly unrelated with
health-care issues. More importantly, the Korean government allowed private health insurance
in 2003, and the enrollment rates soared up, and its total market size was approximately $12
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7 A patientʼs medical record or consultation sheet which a doctor can refer to only includes a patientʼs disease code
and main symptoms of disease, so whether a patient has private health insurance cannot be observed by a doctor in
Korea.
Note: N - No; Y - Yes










TABLE 1.E MPIRICAL MODELS AND STRATEGIES
YY
Y NNYNNbillion in 2005. To reﬂect all factors above, we adopted the NHANS of 2005.
Of total observations of 34,152, we cut oﬀ data of people either younger than 19 or older
than 65 given the assumption that the decisions of people belonging to these groups regarding
whether or not to consume medical services are likely to be inﬂuenced by their family members
or other acquaintances; as a result, our target dataset only include 11,431 observations. In
addition, we further excluded observations which had more than one missing values in critical
socio-economic variables such as income or education level. In the end, the estimation was
performed with 4,513 observations. Since reducing more than half of the sample size due to




Table 2 shows basic descriptive statistics of variables introduced above. There are several
points that should be made. First, the number of physician visits and medical costs appear to be
greater for those who are not covered by private health insurance, contradicting standard moral
hazard assumption. In case of the medical cost variable, this may result from several outliers
who did not purchase private health insurance but underwent severe diseases. They might have
paid a huge amount of out-of-pocket money for medical services. As for the doctor-visit
variable, we conducted t-test to compare the sample mean of each group, and we were not able
to reject the null hypothesis that two sample means were equal at 5% signiﬁcance level.
Regarding control variables, degrees of performing health promotion behaviors are not
diﬀerent between the insured and the uninsured groups according to Table 2. Other variables
indicate that people with more education, higher position in workplace and higher monthly
income more tend to purchase private health insurance. On the other hand, those who report
better health conditions and less chronic diseases are more covered by private health insurance.
If so, the pool of the insured may consist of healthier and wealthier individuals, and
accordingly one may conjecture that moral hazard is not observed in the private health
insurance market if taking into account such characteristics. The following section explores
whether this implication can also be supported when we adopt econometric techniques.
2. Estimation results
(1) Individual choice of private health insurance
Table 3 displays results of estimating equation (1); people are more likely to purchase
private health insurance if they are younger, more educated, have higher monthly income, and
have less chronic diseases. The NHI insurance premium variable, however, indicates the higher
premium, the more demands. To understand why, it is necessary to understand that the
premium variable is not merely an indicator for the price of national health insurance or the
level of income, but may contain far more information. As mentioned before, it is determined
by the Korean government based on the income level of the insured, but because of the way























Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. Mean St. Dev.
10037000 143441.95 6.000 0 16998000
Number of Physician
Visits
1.24 2.210 0 25 1.41 2.043
TIME








Sex(0: male ; 1:
female)
0.42 0.493 0 10.45 0.498 0 1
Age 41.49 11.280 19 65 47.40 13.903
1.047 1 6 3.42 1.319 1 6
Marital Status
(0: not married ; 1:
married)
0.82 0.530 0 10.76 0.789 0 1
10.35 0.476 0 1
Number of Family
Members
3.50 1.176 1 7 2.82 1.216 1 7
Educational Status
(1: no education ; 2:
C elementary school
graduate ; 3: C mid-
dle school graduate;
4: C high school






272.23 160.642 0 998 159.06 124.112 0 998
Job Status
(0: employees or part
time jobs; 1: employ-





2.30 0.818 1 5 1.98 0.964 1 5
Number of Chronic
Diseases





4.67 1.591 0 8 4.67 1.604 1 8




25.38 225.126 0 99.8 10.21 131.667 0 99.8
3600 913
Travel Time to Visit
Doctors (minute)
7.64 29.706 0 888the government imposes it, the variable also contains information which cannot be captured by
researchers, which allows us to explain the ambiguous result on the regression coeﬃcient. The
following reasone also conﬁrm the appropriateness of the variable as an instrument.
First, there exists a time gap between when the government imposed the NHI premium
and when the survey respondents reported their income. To be speciﬁc, the survey on which
this study is based was conducted in 2005, and the questionnaire asked the respondentʼs current
income level of 2005. The NHI premium of 2005 determined by the Korean government, on
the other hand, was retrospectively determined based on the individual income level of 2004
because it is hard to recognize the yearly income level of 2005 at the early stage of that year.
The over- or under-charged NHI premium due to the time gap is supposed to be adjusted in the
April of the following year 2006. In brief, in Korean National Health Insurance system, the
NHI premium is based on the lagged individual income level which does not truthfully
represent the current individual real income level.
Second, the Korean government decides the NHI premium based on seven income
brackets, but not on the actual level of income. Thus, there could be a great diﬀerence between
the actual income people have and the income bracket they belong to; for example, people in
the sixth bracket could be those who earn 50,000,000 Korean won but also could be those who
gain 90,000,000 Korean won on a yearly basis, and this gap cannot be disregarded. Hence this
mechanism of setting NHI premium suggests that the unobserved individual heterogeneity in
terms of individual real income is not considered in the process of determining it, which also
DE-MYSTIFYING THE INCONVENIENT TRUTH: 2010] 139
N
Note:
* ＝ statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.1level;
** ＝ statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level;
*** ＝ statistically































(Ten Thousand Korean Won)
0.0005
* 0.0003
Number of Family Members -0.0090
TABLE 3. PROBIT ESTIMATION RESULTS ON PRIVATE INSURANCE STATUS
0.0302
Educational Status
Number of Chronic Diseases -0.0455
*** 0.0170








(degrees of caring health)
0.0115 0.0238
4513
0.6304indicates the NHI premium is somewhat deviated from the individual real income level.
Furthermore, what is more important fact on this mechanism is that, as already mentioned
in this paper, the NHI premium for the self-employed whose income is not known to Korean
government is set to be equal to the average monthly NHI premium of the overall Korean self-
employed in the previous year. Therefore, this mechanism could also yield a signiﬁcant
disparity from their real income level and the unobserved individual heterogeneity in terms of
his/her real income is not considered in the process of determining it either. Nowadays, a
number of academics, legislators, and media in Korea criticize the mechanism to set the NHI
premium in Korea, claiming that it does not properly reﬂect the real income level of the insured
and accordingly it worsens ﬁnancial deﬁcits of public insurance.
Having considered all these aspects, we can conclude that the individual real income level
and the NHI premium might be correlated in part, but each represents their own characteristics.
In this context, concerning the positive coeﬃcient of NHI premium on individual private
insurance enrollment, it is highly likely that the characteristics of the mechanism of determining
NHI premium explained above may have produced the positive eﬀect. All in all, the variable of
NHI premium is not merely an indicator of the individual level of income, probably containing
far more information which cannot be captured by researchers, and this fact may allow the
variable to function properly as an instrument.
(2) Eﬀect of private health insurance status on number of doctor visit
Model 1, 2, and 3 in Table 4 represent the simple Poisson regression, the two-stage
Poisson regression, and the Heckmanʼs LIML respectively. The most interesting result is that
purchase of private health insurance largely increases the number of doctor visit and it is also
statistically signiﬁcant in the simple Poisson regression model. This can be harmonized with the
moral hazard assumption in the health insurance market. In the two-step Poisson regression,
however, the coeﬃcient decreases dramatically and it also loses statistical signiﬁcance. Hence,
this result does not support the presence of the moral hazard eﬀects in Korean private health
insurance market, and the endogeneity bias is generated by individual unobserved character-
istics associated with the choice of private insurance.
Concerning the validity of instrumental variable, PREMIUM, used for identifying equation
(1) and (2), we tested the relevance and exogeneity of it. With respect to the relevance, we
used the Weak IV test suggested by Stock and Watson (2007). One way to check for weak
instrument when there is a single endogenous variable is to compute the F-statistic testing the
hypothesis that the coeﬃcient on the instrument is equal to zero in the ﬁrst stage regression of
two stage least squares (TSLS); if it is less than 10, the instrument can be regarded as weak,
and the TSLS estimator is biased (Stock and Watson, 2007). In our case, however, the ﬁrst-
stage F statistic is 13.125, supporting the relevance of the instrument used. One should note,
however, that the argument above is based on a linear regression model, not Poisson model
with the probit method. Hence, the tests could not be rigorous and we still need to call for our
intuition to judge the validity explained above.
Testing instrument exogeneity is another issue of concern; if the instruments are not
exogenous, then TSLS is inconsistent. Because we have only one instrument and one
endogenous regressor, it is impossible to develop a statistical test of the hypothesis that the
instruments are in fact exogenous, such as the overidentifying restriction test called J-statistic.
In this case, the only way to assess whether the instrument is exogenous is to depend on
HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [December 140personal knowledge of empirical problem at hand (Stock and Watson, 2007). As mentioned
initially, our common sense indicates that the speciﬁcation of model 2 is appropriate because it
is less plausible that peopleʼs use of medical care is aﬀected by the level of NHI premium
because it is exogenously determined by the government.
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8 Even though the R
2 are not large enough in all models, according to Kenneth et al. (1995), the R
2 in this range is
quite common in cross-sectional data. Thus, it is still worth comparing three modelsʼ results.
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PINSWhen it comes to model 3 which considers the sample selectivity problem, we can reject
the null hypothesis that r=0a t1 % signiﬁcance level, so it suggests that the estimation results
from the Heckmanʼs LIML are more reliable.
In this model, the reduction of the eﬀect of private health insurance on the total number of
doctor visit is more apparent. The coeﬃcient on PINS_HAT which is a predicted value of PINS
from the ﬁrst step, decreases further and displays higher standard errors. Hence, the result of
considering both endogeneity bias and the sample selectivity problem also does not support the
presence of the moral hazard eﬀects in Korean private health insurance market.
One more thing to be mentioned in estimating model 3 is the validity of TIME variable,
the instrument supposed to identify equation (3) and (4). As in the previous case, the validity of
it was tested to check its relevance and exogeneity. First, the relevance was veriﬁed by
computing the ﬁrst stage F-statistic. It was 18.045, conﬁrming that the instrument is not weak.
For exogeneity, because model 3 is also just-identiﬁed, we cannot conduct additional tests such
as the overidentifying restriction test.
10 The only way to check the exogeneity of instrument is
therefore dependent on personal intuition again (Stock and Watson, 2007). Intuitively, the travel
time can aﬀect an individualʼs decision on whether to visit a doctor since it is related to
accessibility to the health care resources; but it is less likely to determine the total amount of
medical care use, which is largely inﬂuenced by supply-side factors such as physiciansʼ practice
style or their incentive structures (Lim and Jo, 2009) due to medical knowledge imbalance
between patients and doctors.
When it comes to other variables, the results support existing theories which have been
widely accepted. For example, the older have a tendency to consume more medical services,
and the job status is a signiﬁcant factor of determining the total number of doctor visit. Also,
the number of chronic diseases is a crucial factor of individual use of medical care services.
(3) Eﬀect of private health insurance status on total medical care cost
The same procedure with the log of medical expenditures as a dependent variable is
performed and the results are presented in Table 5. As in the previous case, PREMIUM and
TIME, the instrumental variables, were proven to be valid instruments. The F-statistics also
conﬁrm that the instruments are not weak.
Among model 1, 2, and 3, model 3 which applies the Heckmanʼs LIML can be considered
as the most reliable one given that the null hypothesis of r=0 is rejected by likelihood ratio
test, which indicates that the error correlation caused by sample selection bias exists.
Estimates from three diﬀerent models exhibit similar patterns with the previous case
(number of physician visits); the coeﬃcients of individual status of private health insurance
identically show positive signs, but the statistical signiﬁcance is not guaranteed in all cases.
Moreover, the highest value in simple OLS regression is reduced after endogeneity and sample
selection bias were controlled. As mentioned previously, the reason we adopt the total medical
cost as another dependent variable is that the frequency of doctor visit cannot capture the
speciﬁc contents of medical care services a patient uses, and cannot control the eﬀect of
patientʼs severity of illness. Therefore, we can strengthen robustness of the estimation results
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10 We have added other possible instrumental variables such as travel costs and speciﬁc insurance types to perform
exogeneity test of instrumental variables, but all of other variables were proved to be weak instrumental variables based
on Weak IV test. So in this paper, only travel time was used as instrumental variable.with this ﬁnding.
Table 6 summarizes the eﬀects of private health insurance on each dependent variable. As
one can see, all estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant except that of the simple Poisson
regression model for physician visits. After controlling the endogeneity and the sample
selection problems, however, it also loses statistical signiﬁcance and the size of the coeﬃcient
also decreases. Thus, these results consistently implicate that the moral hazard eﬀect caused by
private health insurance disappears in Korean case if one controls those confounding factors.
The following can be suggested as one of the reasons that we could not detect the moral
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PINShazard eﬀect in Korean private insurance market. As shown in Table 3, the more educated, the
wealthier and the healthier people more tend to purchase private insurance; these people tend to
have better accessibility to health care resources, and presumably have higher opportunity costs
of being sick. Therefore, if we fail to control the eﬀect of these individual features related to
the private insurance choice, the eﬀect of individual private health insurance status on medical
care use could be overestimated. In other words, if there are some common omitted variables
such as individualʼs time preference, marginal valuation of health status, or degrees of risk
aversion, the decisions on purchasing private health insurance and those on medical care use
could be correlated each other, which causes the estimation result to be biased. Here comes the
reason why we should interpret the phenomenon with the results obtained by further analysis
with Two-Step method and Heckmanʼs approach.
V. Conclusions
To verify the existence of moral hazard in supplemental health insurance market, this
study has investigated the relationship between private health insurance status and the use of
medical services in Korea. In order to produce consistent estimates, we employed two-stage
regression and Heckmanʼs LIML approach. All estimates acquired by such econometric methods
do not allow us to detect the presence of the moral hazard eﬀects. This contradicts the results
obtained by simple regression analysis and demonstrates the importance of controlling
confounding factors; if we fail to control the unobserved characteristics behind the private
insurance choice, the eﬀect of insurance status on medical care use can be overestimated.
Although this paper attempts to discover the moral hazard eﬀects in a possibly robust way
by using several econometric methods, one has to be cautious in interpreting the results.
Because Korea has universal health care system, private health insurance status should not be
equally interpreted as that in other countries. For instance, in the United States, health insurance
is primarily provided by the private sector, with the exception of programs such as Medicare
and Medicaid ̶ i.e. medical costs of most population are reimbursed by private companies. In
Korea, on the other hand, the medical costs are covered ﬁrst by National Health Insurance
(NHI) system and the private insurance plays a supplemental role in covering medical costs that
are not covered by NHI. In this respect, the results would rather allow us to understand how
individualsʼ behaviors change when having supplemental insurance and facing the increased
coverage rate. According to the hypothesis often discussed in information economics, people
might consume more recklessly along with the expanded coverage rate. However, the estimates
in this study indicate that this is not the case in practice, and rather that people hold private
health insurance simply as “safety net.”
Despite its contributions, this study encounters some technical limitations: the model
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TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF ESTIMATION RESULTScannot fully control the reverse causality problem. The property of cross-sectional data restricts
the precise estimation since they do not contain information on the sequence of events. In other
words, we cannot exclude the possible reverse causality problem in which people consume
medical services ﬁrst, and purchase private insurance later; in this case, the same estimation
methods used in this paper cannot be applied. Fortunately, however, the questionnaire is
constructed in an order that coincides with the framework of this study. It asks 1) whether you
are enrolled in private health insurance with no time limit, and 2) how much you have used or
spent for medical services within periods ranging from 2 weeks to 1year. Out of total
respondents, the proportion of people just insured within these periods may not be large enough
to aﬀect the estimation results, so this case is not taken into account in this paper.
In addition, one further and important problem arises: the outcomes are likely to change if
we distinguish whether the insured uses inpatient or outpatient medical care services. That is, it
is conceivable that the outpatient services can be more aﬀected by moral hazard than the
inpatient services because the consumption of inpatient medical services is mainly determined
by patientʼs fatal health status rather than economic motivation.
Because of the time limit and insuﬃcient resources, this paper was not able to cover all
these limitations. Nonetheless, it can contribute to providing useful insights to interpret
consumersʼ behaviors under the distinctive health insurance system in Korea where national
insurance and private insurance coexist and the latter supplements the former. Therefore, it is
recommended for follow-up studies to deal with the remaining limitations so that they can
suggest a way that the Korean government and those of other countries with the similar health
care system fully take advantage of the role of private health insurance.
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